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5.10 Crew Resource Management & Situational Awareness

17 min · UA.V.D.K1a UA.V.D.K2 UA.V.D.K3

Learning objectives
  • Define CRM for an sUAS crew and state which phases of the operation it applies to
  • Run a crew briefing and use closed-loop communication and standard callouts
  • Recognize the warning signs of lost situational awareness and rebuild it
  • Meet the §107.33 visual observer communication requirement and manage client pressure

Crew resource management was invented because of a specific, terrible pattern: perfectly good aircraft flown into the ground by crews of qualified professionals who had all the information they needed and did not use each other. The first officer knew. Nobody asked. The pattern repeats on drone jobs at a smaller scale and with less paperwork.

What CRM is

The PHAK defines it as training “focused on the effective use of all available resources: human resources, hardware, and information supporting ADM to facilitate crew cooperation and improve decision-making.” AC 107-2A ¶5.3 says the same thing for drones: “CRM is a component of ADM, in which the pilot of a small unmanned aircraft makes effective use of all available resources: human resources, hardware, and information.”

In one line: ADM is how one person decides. CRM is how a team decides. And note the word *resources* — it is broader than people. Your resources include the manufacturer's manual, the Chart Supplement, LAANC, the aircraft's own telemetry, the client's knowledge of their own site, the facility security officer, the airport manager's phone number, and your checklist. Flying single-pilot does not exempt you; the FAA calls that single-pilot resource management, and it is the same discipline with a shorter roster.

The tested item: all phases

One of the FAA's published sample questions asks: when adapting CRM concepts to the operation of a small UA, CRM must be integrated into what? The answer is all phases of the operation — not the flight portion only, and not the communications only.

This is not merely a test fact. The decisions that determine whether a flight is safe are made during planning, the site survey, the briefing, setup, and teardown. By the time the props are spinning, most of your risk is already fixed. And the single most dangerous moment on many jobs is the walk back to the truck with a hot battery in one hand while the client asks about the invoice.

Who is on the crew

The crew briefing card: roles, mission, conditions, hazards, emergency and contingency procedures, communication method and standard calls, and the explicit statement that anyone may call a stop.
The crew briefing card: roles, mission, conditions, hazards, emergency and contingency procedures, communication method and standard calls, and the explicit statement that anyone may call a stop.

The crew briefing

The briefing is not a courtesy. It is a regulation, and it has five named contents.

14 CFR § 107.49(b)

Prior to flight, the remote pilot in command must ensure that all persons directly participating in the small unmanned aircraft operation are informed about the operating conditions, emergency procedures, contingency procedures, roles and responsibilities, and potential hazards.

Memorize those five. A briefing that actually works looks like this:

  1. Who is who — remote PIC, person on the controls, visual observers, payload, ground crew. Use names, not job titles.
  2. The mission — what we are flying, where, how high, how long, how many batteries, what the shots or the data products are.
  3. Operating conditions — weather now and expected, wind and gusts, temperature, light and sunset time, airspace class, authorization in hand, NOTAMs and TFRs checked.
  4. Potential hazards — wires, towers, cranes, trees, the road, the school across the street, the nesting hawk, the RF environment, the crowd expected at three o'clock.
  5. Roles and responsibilities — who watches which sector, who talks to the client, who calls traffic, who handles the perimeter.
  6. Emergency procedures — lost link, fly-away, low battery, injury, battery fire. Where the extinguisher is, where the first aid kit is, who calls 911 and what street address they give.
  7. Contingency procedures — the alternate landing zone, the abort criteria, what happens if a non-participant enters the area.
  8. Communication — what we are using (voice, radio, headset, hand signals), the standard calls, and the stop word.
  9. Questions, and one explicit statement: anyone here can call a stop, at any time, for any reason, with no consequence. Then honor it the first time it is used, or it is dead forever.

Re-brief whenever something material changes: a new crew member, a new location, a new client request, worsening weather. A briefing is a snapshot, and snapshots go stale.

Knowledge check 1

Which of these is one of the five items §107.49(b) requires the remote PIC to brief to all directly participating persons?

  1. The aircraft's registration number and the remote PIC's certificate number
  2. Contingency procedures
  3. The client's contact information and billing arrangements

Answer: B. §107.49(b) names exactly five: operating conditions, emergency procedures, contingency procedures, roles and responsibilities, and potential hazards. Registration and certificate numbers must be available for inspection under §107.7 and §107.13, but they are not part of the required crew briefing.

Communication that works

Standard callouts. Short, unambiguous, and always the same words. The point of standardization is that a phrase means one thing even when the person hearing it is busy.

Closed-loop communication is the second habit. The sender says it, the receiver reads it back, the sender confirms. “Descend to one hundred feet.” “Descending to one hundred.” “That's correct.” It feels stilted for about a day, and then it becomes the thing that catches the misunderstanding that would otherwise have become an accident. Silence is not agreement. Silence means you do not know.

Hearing or speech impairment does not disqualify a crew member. AC 107-2A accepts alternative methods such as sign language, provided the crew has the constant ability to understand one another.

The visual observer and §107.33

14 CFR § 107.33

If a visual observer is used: (a) the remote PIC, the person manipulating the flight controls, and the visual observer must maintain effective communication with each other at all times; (b) the remote PIC must ensure that the visual observer is able to see the unmanned aircraft in the manner specified in §107.31; and (c) all three must coordinate to scan the airspace where the aircraft is operating for any potential collision hazard, and to maintain awareness of the position of the aircraft through direct visual observation.

Situational awareness

The PHAK defines situational awareness as “the accurate perception and understanding of all the factors and conditions within the five fundamental risk elements... that comprise any given aviation situation.” For a drone crew, that means holding a live, accurate mental model of: where the aircraft is and what it is doing, what is in the air around it, what is on the ground under it, how much battery and link you have left, what the weather is doing, and what the plan is for the next two minutes.

Knowing where the icon is on the screen is not situational awareness. It is one input, and it is the input most likely to be wrong.

The warning signs you have lost it

Rebuilding it

  1. Fly the aircraft. Stabilize it — hover in clear air, climb to a known-safe altitude, or land. A stable aircraft buys you time, and time is what you have lost.
  2. Say it out loud. “I've lost the picture.” Naming it recruits your crew instead of hiding the problem from them.
  3. Go back to what you know for certain — position, altitude, battery, home point, wind direction, where the sun is.
  4. Resolve the ambiguity with the most reliable source, which is almost always your own eyes on the actual aircraft.
  5. Reduce workload. Stop the shot. Stop the conversation. Hand the camera to someone else.
  6. Rebuild the plan from where you actually are, not from where you meant to be.
  7. If you cannot rebuild it, land. Landing is always available and it is always cheap.
Knowledge check 2

Mid-flight, your visual observer reports the aircraft is north of the building while your screen shows it south. What is the correct first action?

  1. Trust the telemetry, since GPS position is more precise than a human estimate
  2. Stop the task, stabilize the aircraft, and resolve the disagreement by direct visual observation before continuing
  3. Initiate return-to-home immediately and sort it out after landing

Answer: B. A disagreement between two sources is a classic signal of degraded situational awareness, and continuing while it is unresolved is how the chain builds. Stabilize first, then resolve with the most reliable source — direct visual contact. Blind RTH is risky when you do not know where the aircraft actually is, because RTH flies a straight line through whatever is in the way.

External pressure from the client

The client is paying, is frequently standing next to you, and usually has no idea what is unsafe. “Can you get one more?” “The last guy flew here.” “We only have the crane on site today.” None of that is malice. All of it is pressure.

Common trap

Two CRM traps on the exam. First, CRM applies to all phases of the operation — an answer limiting it to the flight portion, or to communications, is wrong. Second, CRM is not only for multi-person crews. A solo remote pilot still manages resources: information, hardware, checklists, weather sources, ATC, and the people on site who are not formally crew.

Safety culture and standard operating procedures

One of the FAA's sample questions describes a news station whose drone team has had repeated near misses and two accidents, and asks what would improve the safety culture. The answer: recognize hazardous attitudes and develop standard operating procedures that emphasize safety. Not a policy allowing no more than five crashes in six months. Not “no changes are needed.”

That answer is correct for a reason worth understanding. Repeated events across different pilots and different aircraft is a systems problem, not a personnel problem. Setting a tolerable crash rate normalizes the crashes. The fix is written procedure plus honest self-assessment of the attitudes driving the behavior.

Know this cold
  • CRM must be integrated into ALL PHASES of the operation — this is a published FAA sample question, and the wrong answers are “the flight portion only” and “the communications only.”
  • CRM is the effective use of all available resources: human resources, hardware, and information.
  • §107.49(b) briefing, five items: operating conditions, emergency procedures, contingency procedures, roles and responsibilities, potential hazards.
  • §107.33 requires effective communication at all times among the remote PIC, the person on the controls, and the visual observer — and the VO must be able to see the aircraft unaided under §107.31.
  • Warning signs of lost situational awareness: fixation, ambiguity, confusion, failure to meet planned targets, unbriefed procedure, and nobody flying the aircraft.
  • A team with repeated accidents fixes it by recognizing hazardous attitudes and developing SOPs that emphasize safety — not by setting an acceptable crash rate.
Beyond the test

Give every crew member, including the newest ground assistant, explicit authority to stop the operation — and then engineer the first use of it. Ask someone to call a stop during a training flight and thank them publicly for it. The authority is worthless until the crew has watched you honor it once.

Lesson summary
  • CRM is the effective use of all available resources — human, hardware and information — and it must be integrated into all phases of the operation, not just the flight
  • An sUAS crew may include the remote PIC, a person manipulating the controls, visual observers, a payload operator and ground crew; the client is not crew but is part of the risk picture
  • §107.49(b) requires briefing operating conditions, emergency procedures, contingency procedures, roles and responsibilities, and potential hazards
  • Use standard callouts and closed-loop communication, and give every crew member explicit authority to call a stop
  • §107.33 requires effective communication at all times with a visual observer, who must see the aircraft unaided as §107.31 specifies — a VO does not extend your legal range
  • Signs of lost situational awareness include fixation, ambiguity, confusion, missed targets, unbriefed procedure, and nobody flying the aircraft; rebuild by stabilizing, naming it, and landing if needed
  • Repeated accidents are a systems problem: the fix is recognizing hazardous attitudes and developing standard operating procedures that emphasize safety